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DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO PROTECTION FROM
PRIOR UNCOUNSELED CONVICTIONS
One objective of the criminal justice system is to attain an accurate
determination of guilt or innocence. In pursuit of this objective, the
Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright1 recognized that a defendant
in a state felony trial has an unqualified right to counsel. Recently the
Court held in Argersinger v. Hamlin2 that this right extends to all de-
fendants who face incarceration if convicted. This note will discuss
certain rules fashioned by the Supreme Court subsequent to Gideon
and designed to protect a defendant from the prejudicial use of his ear-
lier uncounseled convictions..3
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942),
which held that a refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a
felony did not violate due process unless the crime charged was a capital offense or
"special circumstances" were involved. Prior to Gideon, felony convictions were over-
turned in several cases because of "special circumstances." See Carnley v. Cochran,
369 U.S. 506 (1962) (illiteracy); Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962)
(habitual criminal); McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961) (complexity of statute and
nature of the offense charged); Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960)
(youth)z Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) (youth, race, and minimal educa-
tion); State ex rel. Herman v. Cloudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956) (limited educational
background); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954) (mental retardation); Palmer v.
Ashe. 342 U.S. 134 (1951) (mentally abnormal); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437
(1948) (youth); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (misconduct by court of-
ficials), Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948) (extent of defendant's prior experience
with criminal proceedings); Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1947) (youth);
DeMeerler v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947) (youth); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786
(1945) (complex legal questions).
For a comprehensive survey of state interpretation of the right to counsel provided by
Gideon, see Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the
Fifty States, 3 CEIGHTON L. REv. 103 (1970).
2. In Argersinger, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972), the Supreme Court held that "no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor,
or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." The trial judge must
determine before trial if he will impose a jail term on the defendant if he is found
guilty of the offense charged.
3. It is possible that some pre-Gideon uncounseled convictions are not infirm.
For instance, Wisconsin provided counsel to felony defendants prior to Gideon, but a
counseled defendant could waive his right to counsel. If the Wisconsin waiver stand-
ard passes muster under currently recognized constitutional standards, then those
convictions, although obtained without counsel, would stand. Also included in the
class would be all uncounseled convictions occurring after Gideon that can be col-
laterally attacked, such as those in which the defendant invalidly waived his right to
counsel.
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PROTECTION FROM UNCOUNSELED CONVICTIONS IN
SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS
The issue of whether convictions which are infirm under Gideon
could be used in subsequent proceedings first came before the Supreme
Court in Burgett v. Texas.4  The judge had read a five-count indict-
ment to the jury at the beginning of the trial." The first count charged
assault with intent to murder; the other counts, alleging four prior con-
victions, charged a violation of the Texas recidivist statutes. The prose-
cution offered two different records of one of the convictions-the first
indicated that Burgett was not represented by counsel, but the second
omitted any reference to counsel. The trial court admitted the second
record into evidence, but subsequently instructed the jury not to con-
sider it or the other convictions for any purpose. Noting the over-
whelming effect a prior conviction has upon the minds of the jurors,
the Supreme Court found that the admission of the prior uncounseled
conviction was inherently prejudicial. The instructions to the jury to
disregard the uncounseled conviction had not made the error of its ad-
mission "harmless beyond reasonable doubt." The Court prohibited
use of uncounseled convictions either to "support guilt ' or "enhance
punishment '7 because such use of uncounseled convictions caused the
defendant to "suffer anew" from the earlier denial of his right to coun-
sel.
4. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
5. The Texas procedure of introducing evidence of past convictions to the jury
by reading the indictment was first embodied in TEXAS CODE CRIm. PRO. ANN. art.
642 (1925), and modified by TEXAs CODE CRIM. PRo. ANN. art. 36.01 (1966):
The indictment or information shall be read to the jury by the attorney
prosecuting. When prior convictions are alleged for purposes of enhanlcement
only and are not jurisdictional, that portion of the indictment or information
reciting such convictions shall not be read until the hearing on punishment
is held ...
No other state follows the previous Texas procedure.
6. Since Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), an error of constitutional
magnitude may be regarded "harmless" if the court can determine that the error was
"harmless beyond reasonable doubt." The court must conclude that the error did not
contribute to the verdict obtained, see Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). In
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), the Court found that the use of con-
fessions by co-defendants who did not testify amounted to denial of petitioner's right
of confrontation. However, the evidence supplied by the confessions was merely
cumulative, and the other evidence was so overwhelming that the Court could conclude
beyond reasonable doubt that denial of petitioner's right to confrontation was harmless
error. Accord, Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972).
7. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
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Burgett began a line of cases which extended the impact of the
Gideon decision. While Gideon involved the custodial consequences of
an uncounseled conviction," Burgett, on the other hand, provides a form
of post-custody relief to a defendant who faces possible recurring ad-
verse consequences from a record of uncounseled convictions.9 In this
sense the relief is derived from a retroactive application of Gideon, but
it is provided after release from custody for the uncounseled conviction.
An important question that arises from Burgett is to what extent the
Supreme Court meant to provide a rule against the use of a record of
uncounseled convictions in subsequent criminal proceedings. This
question has two aspects: first, what limitations exist on the use of un-
counseled convictions in subsequent proceedings; secondly, if an un-
counseled conviction is improperly used, may that use be harmless er-
ror. Cases after Burgett have dealt with these questions.
THE USE OF UNCOUNSELED CONVICTIONS TO ENHANCE PUNISHMENT
United States v. Tucker,10 the first Supreme Court case after Burgett
to deal with the use of a prior uncounseled conviction at a subsequent
trial, specifically involved that branch of Burgett which prohibited the
use of uncounseled convictions to enhance punishment. Tucker in-
volved the use of uncounseled convictions by a sentencing judge. To
understand the implications of this use it is necessary to review the task
of the judge in sentencing proceedings.
The object of the sentencing judge is to arrive at a sentence that will
"fit the offender, not merely the crime.'"' The judge is given broad
discretion' and must consider many factors,'13 such as the defendant's
8. Gideon began his plea to the Supreme Court by filing a habeas corpus petition
apparently prepared by himself. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337 n.1
(1963).
9. For a general discussion of post-custody relief, see Note, The Development of
Independent Jurisdictional Significance for Civil Disabilities: The Post-Custody Peti-
tion, 1969 WASH. U.L.Q. 436. An interesting view, expressed by Judge Friendly, is
that collateral attack of convictions at any time should be heard only when the attack
casts some doubt on the guilt of the defendant. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142 (1970).
10. 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
11. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See generally R. DAWSON,
SENTENCING: DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 62, 385-87
(1969) [hereinafter cited as DAWsON]; S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRUMINAL CORRECTION
646 (1963) [hereinafter cited as RUBIN].
12. "[A] judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely un-
limited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which
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potential for rehabilitation and the need to protect society from further
crimes by the defendant, deterring others from similar crimes, and pun-
ishing the defendant for his wrong. 14  In analyzing these factors, judges
give much weight to the defendant's prior criminal record.'5 Conse-
quently, the information considered by the judge must be accurate and
reliable in order to achieve the desired result of meting out a sentence
which fits the offender.' 6
Since the Supreme Court condemned sentencing on an erroneous
record in Townsend v. Burke,17 a due process argument has existed
it may come." United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). See North Caro-
lina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949);
United States v. Trigg, 392 F.2d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 1968); Davis v. United States,
376 F.2d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 1967); Cross v. United States, 354 F.2d 512, 514 (DC.
Cir. 1965); United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir. 1965).
13. DAWSON, supra note 11, at 38, 81. Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure states that the presentence report shall include for consideration by the sen-
tencing judge "any prior criminal record of the defendant . . . and such other in-
formation as may be required by the court." FED. R. CriM. P. 32. The Model Penal
Code provides a more specific description of the material considered during a presen-
tence investigation. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07(3) states:
The pre-sentence investigation shall include an analysis of the circumstances
attending the commission of the crime, the defendant's history of delinquency
or criminality, physical and mental condition, family situation and background,
economic status, education, occupation and personal habits and any other
matters that the probation officer deems relevant or the Court directs to be
included.
The Missouri Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that the presentence report must
include defendant's prior criminal record and, when practical, a physical and mental
examination. Mo. Supl. CT. (Cium.) R. 27.07(b). For a general discussion of presen-
tence reports in Missouri, see Note, Use of Pre-Sentence Investigation in Missouri,
1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 396.
14. See RuniN, supra note 11, at 646 et seq.
15. Except upon conviction of a serious prime, a defendant with no prior
convictions is almost always given probation. See DAwsoN, supra note 11, at 81:
Attention is directed primarily at prior felony convictions. A defendant who
has several misdemeanor convictions on his record or several arrests not fol-
lowed by conviction is regarded as a first offender for these purposes.
16. Authorities have criticized existing legal standards concerning the trial judge's
responsibility for assuring accuracy of presentence information as being absent or at
best uncertain. Greater control could be accomplished, it is argued, if appellate courts
would adopt a more active role in reviewing discretion employed in sentencing.
Appellate courts have traditionally refused to review sentences that are within statu-
tory limits. See DAwsoN, supra note 11, at 62, 385-87; D'Esposito, Sentencing Dis-
parity: Causes and Cures, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 182, 191 (1969).
17. 334 U.S. 736 (1948). In Townsend, the Court held that the absence of coun-
sel during sentencing after a guilty plea, coupled with erroneous interpretation of de-
fendant's prior criminal record, deprived the defendant of due process of law. Counsel
would have been under a duty to prevent the court from proceeding on false assump-
tions.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/11
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that one cannot be sentenced on a criminal record which is "ma-
terially untrue."ls The unreliability present in the record condemned
in Townsend is similarly present when a sentencing judge relies on un-
counseled convictions in determining sentence. 19 Although the Court
in Burgett condemned the use of uncounseled convictions to impose a
more severe sentence under a Texas recidivist statute, the Court did not
determine whether the use of prior uncounseled convictions in deter-
mining sentence was prejudicial error in the absence of a recidivist
statute. The Court in Tucker 20 reviewed a sentence that was not based
on a recidivist statute nor in excess of statutory limits. The alleged irreg-
ularity was that prior to sentencing the trial judge had heard evidence of
prior convictions. Thus, it was possible that the judge had considered the
convictions in arriving at the sentence imposed on Tucker.
The majority of the Court concluded that resentencing was required
on the basis of two constitutional principles. First, the Court returned
to the statement of Townsend that a prisoner should not be sentenced
on a record "materially untrue." Assuming that the sentencing judge
considered the uncounseled convictions, the majority found the result-
ing sentence based "at least in part upon misinformation of constitu-
tional magnitude."2 1  Secondly, the majority noted that the Burgett de-
cision held that the use of uncounseled convictions to "support guilt" or
to "enhance punishment" was to "erode the principle of [Gideon]."2
18. Some authorities regard the absence of counsel essential to the holding in
Townsend. Others maintain that Townsend establishes the right to be sentenced on the
basis of accurate information, and that this right can only be enforced by provision
for not only counsel but also disclosure of the facts relied upon in sentencing. See
generally Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV.
L. REv. 821, 826 (1968).
19. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972): "As in Townsend v.
Burke . . . 'this prisoner was sentenced on the basis of assumptions concerning his
criminal record [of prior uncounseled convictions] which were materially untrue."'
20. Tucker was convicted of robbery in 1953. He testified on his own behalf
during the trial and admitted three prior felony convictions on cross-examination.
Tucker flatly stated that he had stolen a car and broken into a jewelry store at night-
the activities which led to the challenged convictions. The court of appeals affirmed
the determination of the district court that the admission of the uncounseled convictions
for impeachment was harmless error, Tucker v. United States, 431 F.2d 1292 (9th
Cir. 1970), but remanded for resentencing due to the reasonable probability that the
uncounseled convictions led the sentencing judge to impose a more severe sentence
than if the judge had not known about the convictions. The United States then peti-
tioned for certiorari, seeking reversal of the decision of the court of appeals insofar
as it remanded the case for resentencing.
21. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972).
22, Id. at 449.
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To prevent that erosion in Tucker, the Court remanded for resentenc-
ing.
The dissenting Justices argued that Tucker's admission of the under-
lying criminal activity would probably have led the sentencing judge to
impose the maximum term provided by statute without giving any
consideration to the invalid convictions.28 However, the dissenting
Justices did not dispute the general rule that resentencing is required
when the judge relies on uncounseled convictions in determining sen-
tence.
24
The import of the Tucker decision lies in its applying the "principle
of Gideon," as extended in Burgett, that the accused should not suffer
from the unconstitutional denial of his right to counsel. Tucker pro-
hibits a trial judge from considering previous uncounseled convictions
when determining a defendant's sentence. 25 In this regard, the Tucker
23. Id. at 452 (Blackmun, J., and Burger, C.I, dissenting).
24. Speculation by both the majority and dissent in Tucker concerning the facts
relied upon by the sentencing judge demonstrates the need for disclosure of those facts
relied upon. Prior to the adoption of the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 32 provided that the judge may disclose any part or all of the
facts contained in the presentence report.
Rule 32.2 of the Proposed Amendment to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires full disclosure of the presentence report unless the court finds that the in-
formation would be harmful to the defendant or others. If harmful, the court would be
required to summarize the facts relied on in sentencing. Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedures of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft
of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United
States District Courts, 48 F.R.D. 547, 614 (1970). Statement of facts relied upon in
sentencing is not a new idea. Opinions were required in California until 1970, when the
legislature left the decision to file an opinion to the trial judge's discretion. However,
a copy of the presentence report is still made part of the record of the case. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1203.01 (Deering Supp. 1971).
No state has a statute that flatly forbids disclosure of the presentence report, but
most states have no statute concerning disclosure. This is usually interpreted as leav-
ing the decision to the discretion of the court. For a fuller discussion of this topic, see
Lehrich, The Use and Disclosure of Presentence Reports in the United States, 47
F.R.D. 225 (1969).
25. Lower courts have had no difficulty in giving effect to the Tucker decision,
ordering resentencing for those prisoners who present satisfactory evidence of uncoun-
seled convictions used to enhance punishment, and ordering evidentiary hearings for
those unable to meet their burden of proof. See Davis v. Wainwright, 462 F.2d 1359
(5th Cir. 1972) (hearing granted to petitioner who claimed uncounseled convictions
were considered in sentencing); Garrett v. Swenson, 459 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1972) (evi-
dentiary hearing granted when petitioner claimed that one of three prior convictions
considered by sentencing judge was uncounseled); United States ex rel. Miscanage v.
Howard County District Court, 339 F. Supp. 292 (D.NJ. 1972) (resentencing ordered
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prohibition extends to every sentencing situation, whereas Burgett
might have reached only those situations dealing with sentencing under
a recidivist statute.
THE USE OF UNCOUNSELED CONVICTIONS TO SUPPORT GUILT
The Court in Burgett also announced a prohibition against the use of
an uncounseled conviction to "support guilt." Here, the question is
whether the defendant committed the alleged offense, not what his pun-
ishment should be. Since the procedure by which the uncounseled con-
viction evidence was placed before the Burgett jury is no longer fol-
lowed in any jurisdiction,2" uncounseled convictions used to support
guilt now appear before juries as impeachment evidence27 either to at-
tack the general credibility of the defendant as a witness or to impeach
a specific statement made by the defendant from the witness stand.
In confronting the problem of whether the use of uncounseled con-
victions for impeachment purposes was reversible error, lower courts
for petitioner sentenced as a fourth offender because prior record of conviction had
the words "his counsel being present" stricken with asterisks).
26. See note 5 supra.
27. The use of prior criminal convictions as impeachment evidence is a conven-
tional trial tactic. See 3A J. WIGMoRB, EVIDENcE §§ 890-91 (Chadboum rev. ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]. The tactic is often employed because of the
natural and inevitable tendency of the judge or jury "to give excessive weight to the
vicious record of crime thus exhibited." 1 WIGMoRE § 194. Courts disagree as to
what crimes may be used for impeachment. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 6-09
limits the use of convictions for purposes of attacking the credibility of the witness to
crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or involving dis-
honesty or a false statement regardless of punishment. Convictions of any type are
inadmissible if more than ten years have passed since the date of release from prison
or expiration of parole. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of
Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 295 et
seq. (1969). The states have treated convictions as impeachment evidence in diverse
ways. For example, California limits convictions used for impeachment to felonies
alone. CAL. Evm. CODE § 788 (Deering 1966); Maine permits felonies and misde-
meanors involving "moral turpitude" to be used for impeachment, State v. Jenness,
143 Me. 380, 62 A.2d 867 (1948); and Oklahoma admits convictions of any crimes,
Coslow v. State, 83 Okla. Crim. 378, 177 P.2d 518 (1947).
Commentators suggest that the best approach is to permit the use of any prior con-
victions for impeachment only if the defendant puts his character in issue by first in-
troducing evidence to support his credibility. See 3A WIGMORE §§ 890-91. This is
the position taken in the Uniform Rules of Evidence. See UNiFoRm RULE OF EViDENCE
21.
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reached inconsistent results.25 Some courts took the view that prior
uncounseled convictions so taint the impeachment effort as to preclude
any possibility of harmless error. 29 These decisions appear consistent
with the statement in Burgett that the introduction of prior uncounseled
convictions is "inherently prejudicial."30  Other decisions evinced the
rationale that evidence other than the convictions permitted a finding
that the introduction of the convictions was harmless error.31 Courts
adopting this latter view interpreted the Burgett statement that such
convictions are "inherently prejudicial" to mean that instructions to dis-
regard the convictions were not enough to permit a finding of harmless
error. Such instructions in the presence of other evidence, however,
28. On the federal level, compare United States ex rel. Walker v. Follette, 443
F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1971) (prior uncounseled convictions may be introduced to impeach
a specific statement made by the defendant as a witness), with Subilosky v. Moore,
443 F.2d 334 (1st Cir. 1971) (use of prior uncounseled convictions to impeach general
credibility of defendant is harmless error), and Howard v. Craven, 446 F.2d 586 (9th
Cir. 1971) (use of prior uncounseled convictions to impeach credibility of defendant is
prejudicial error).
On the state level, compare Spaulding v. State, 451 P.2d 389 (Alas. 1971) (preju-
dicial error), with Johnson v. State, 9 Md. App. 166, 263 A.2d 232 (1970) (harmless
error).
29. See Howard v. Craven, 446 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1971). Two prior felony
convictions were introduced to impeach the credibility of the defendant. One of the
convictions was invalid by Gideon. The prosecutor asserted to the jury that because
defendant had been twice convicted of felonies, his testimony under oath could be
equated to "Grimm's Fairy Tales." The court found that such error could not be
termed harmless, and distinguished the situation from that of Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971), and United States ex rel. Walker v. Follette, 311 F. Supp. 490
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), on the basis that both Harris and Walker involved rebuttal of a spe-
cific statement and Harris involved a violation of Miranda.
30. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967):
The admission of a prior criminal conviction which is constitutionally infirm
under the standards of Gideon v. Wainwright is inherently prejudicial and
we are unable to say that the instructions to disregard it made the constitu-
tional error "harmless beyond reasonable doubt" within the meaning of Chap-
man v. California ....
3L Subilosky v. Moore, 443 F.2d 334 (1st Cir. 1971) (when defendant admitted
on direct examination that he was a habitual criminal, the introduction of an uncounseled
conviction to impeach his credibility was harmless error); Tucker v. United States,
431 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (de-
fendant's admission of the underlying criminal activity which led to the uncounseled
convictions made their introduction to impeach his credibility harmless error); Gil-
day v. Scafati, 428 F.2d 1027 (1st Cir. 1970) (uncounseled conviction as evidence was
harmless error when three eyewitnesses identified defendant as perpetrator of the
crime); Johnson v. State, 9 Md. App. 166, 263 A.2d 232 (1970) (uncounseled convic-
tion used for impeachment of general credibility when uncounseled conviction was for a
misdemeanor and was admitted with valid felony convictions).
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may permit a finding of harmless error.32  Finally, some courts held
that Burgett did not reach guilt determinations, but rather was limited
to sentence enhancement. 3
Considering the uncertainty as to what extent, if any, Burgett was in-
tended to reach the guilt determination question, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in a guilt determination case and established the rule
to be followed. The case, Loper v. Beto,34 involved the use of un-
counseled convictions to impeach a defendant's general credibility as a
witness."', At Loper's trial the prosecutor had introduced evidence of
four prior convictions to impeach Loper. The issue of credibility was
32. The California Supreme Court presented this rationale in the case In re Dabney,
71 Cai. 2d 1, 452 P.2d 924, 76 Cal. Rptr. 636 (1969), but awarded Dabney a new trial
on his claim that both his conviction and augmented penalty as a second narcotics
offender were obtained by means of an uncounseled conviction. The court indicated
that a prior conviction of the same offense for which the defendant is being tried is so
prejudicial that it cannot be termed harmless error. The First Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted similar logic on the harmless error rationale in Gilday v. Scafati, 428 F.2d
1027, 1029 (Ist Cir. 1970).
33. See Simmons v. State, 456 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (Burgett did not
reach the situation in which uncounseled convictions were used to impeach credibility).
It is not always clear whether the uncounseled conviction is supporting guilt or en-
hancing punishment. If, for example, the defendant is charged with possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon and the prior conviction is uncounseled, that prior con-
viction may be both supporting guilt and enhancing punishment. Courts faced with
this question have reversed the convictions for possession of firearms in such situations,
citing but not analyzing Burgett. See United States v. Lufman, 457 F.2d 165 (7th Cir.
1972)-; United States v. DuShane, 435 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1970). See also Tucker v.
Craven, 421 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1969); Oswald v. Crouse, 420 F.2d 373 (10th Cir.
1969); United States v. Martinez, 413 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1969); Beto v. Sacks, 408
F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1969); Losieau v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1969); Williams v.
Coiner, 392 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1968).
34. 405 U.S. 473 (1972). Four prior convictions were introduced at Loper's trial
for rape to impeach his testimony. All four convictions were for burglary, three in
Mississippi in the years 1931, 1932, and 1935, one in Tennessee in 1940. Loper testi-
fied that he could not afford an attorney at the 1931 and 1940 convictions. A rec-
ord of the 1931 conviction made no reference to whether Loper had counsel. The
1940 conviction record stated that Loper appeared "in his own proper person." The
record of the 1935 conviction stated that Loper appeared "in Person" and that the
court heard "arguments of Counsel." No record or testimony was introduced with re-
spect to the 1932 conviction. The plurality of the Court assumed that Loper's testi-
mony and the records of the convictions presented established absence of the counsel.
The dissenting Justices disputed whether petitioner, in seeking habeas corpus relief, had
shown the absence of counsel. The district court, in denying relief of habeas corpus,
placed "little or no credence" in Loper's oral testimony.
35. The Loper decision did not deal with the question of whether uncounseled
prior convictions can be used to impeach a specific statement made by the defendant
from the witness stand. Id. at 482 n.11.
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critical, since the prosecution had only one eyewitness, the victim of
Loper's alleged attack. Loper was convicted. Later, he sought habeas
corpus relief, alleging that the use of the earlier convictions was re-
versible error since he had not been represented by counsel during the
trials which led to the convictions. The district court's denial of relief
was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 0 The Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the court of ap-
peals.
In reaching their decision, four Justices held the instant use of un-
counseled convictions to be a denial of due process and prejudicial er-
ror.3 7  Justice White concurred, but indicated two reservations. 8
First, he seemed dissatisfied with the evidence the petitioner presented
as to the infirmity of his previous convictions.8 0 This can only be taken
as a warning to future defendants that they must present more con-
vincing evidence. Secondly, Justice White indicated that the use of un-
counseled convictions to impeach could be harmless error in some
cases. 40 Four Justices dissented on other grounds.41
36. Loper v. Beto, 440 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1971).
37. Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, de-
livered the majority opinion of the Court, 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
38. Id. at 485.
39. The Court divided on the issue of the burden of proof upon a petitioner who
collaterally attacks a judgment by habeas corpus. The plurality of the Court assumed
Loper's testimony regarding the absence of counsel and the records of the convictions
established the fact that he was uncounseled at the proceedings which led to the con-
victions. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, joined by the other dissenting Justices, disputed this
conclusion. Justice Rehnquist would limit the application of the rule established in
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), that there was a presumption against
waiver of the right to counsel in the face of a silent record, to Carnley-type situations-
refusals by state courts to vacate recent judgments of lower state courts. In habeas cor-
pus proceedings dealing with the question of whether defendant was denied his right to
counsel under Gideon, such as the Loper situation, Justice Rehnquist would apply a
"presumption of regularity" to the challenged convictions on the basis of Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1937).
40. 405 U.S. at 485 (1972).
41. Chief Justice Burger felt that the Court should not extend the Loper rule to
petitioner's conviction because it occurred prior to Gideon. While the Chief Justice
expressed no difficulty with the application of Gideon to invalidate a conviction ob-
tained without presence of counsel, he did not feel that Gideon retroactivity should be
expressed to the extent that it was in Loper. Id. at 485-94.
Justice Blackmun would not have reversed on various practical grounds. Id. at
494-96.
Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court had improvidently granted certiorari in this
case. He felt Loper had failed to sustain the burden of proof necessary to raise the
issue before the Court. Id. at 497-503. See note 39 supra.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/11
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The breadth of the Loper holding is uncertain. It is possible that
the rationale reaches no further than those situations in which the de-
fendant's credibility is a critical matter and the impeachment evidence
consists almost entirely of uncounseled convictions.4 2  A broader read-
ing would extend the rationale along two possible lines. First, Loper
may extend to those cases in which more than one witness testifies
against the defendant.43  Secondly, the decision may reach cases in
which the uncounseled convictions provide only a minimal contribu-
tion to the impeachment evidence.44 In this regard, the impact of the
uncounseled convictions could reach a point of de minimis signifi-
cance.
It is impossible to determine from the Loper opinion whether the rule
announced will extend along either of these lines. Several decisions
which anticipated Loper from Burgett seemed to consider the critical
character of the defendant's testimony and the presence of impeachment
evidence other than the convictions in determining whether the error
was harmless.'- If Loper does not lay down a per se rule for all
42. In Loper there was only one eyewitness who could identify defendant as the
perpetrator. Thus, since Loper took the stand to deny guilt, the jury had to make its
decision on the basis of credibility. The prosecutor relied solely upon Loper's con-
victions for impeachment purposes. Id. at 474.
43. It would appear that as the number of eyewitnesses testifying against a de-
fendant increased, the likelihood that a jury would believe a defendant's denial would
decrease, even without impeachment evidence. Thus, a court may be willing to find
in such cases, where there are numerous eyewitnesses, that the admission of uncoun-
seled convictions to impeach constitutes harmless error. The problem lies in drawing a
limit in this regard. See Gilday v. Scafati, 428 F.2d 1027 (1st Cir. 1970). But see
Spaulding v. State, 481 P.2d 389 (Alas. 1971).
44, Often valid as well as invalid convictions form the basis of the prosecutor's
impeachment evidence. See, e.g., Subilosky v. Moore, 443 F.2d 334 (1st Cir. 1971).
It would seem that, if the valid convictions were for serious offenses and the invalid
convictions were not, then the likelihood of finding harmless error is greater. See
Commonwealth v. Boudreau, - Mass. -, 285 N.E.2d 915 (1972) (assault conviction
valid, traffic violation conviction invalid: no reversible error); Johnson v. Maryland,
265 A.2d 281 (Md. 1970) (felony convictions valid, misdemeanor conviction invalid:
harmless error). When there is no disparity in the seriousness of the crimes for which
defendant was convicted, the problem is more difficult. See Howard v. Craven, 446
F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1971) (one valid and one invalid conviction, no disparity in seri-
ousness of crimes: reversible error). If the invalid convictions were for serious of-
fenses and the valid convictions for minor offenses, the likelihood of a harmless error
ruling is slight in the absence of other evidence properly attacking defendant's credi-
bility. The effect that the impeachment evidence other than the convictions would
have in the presence of an uncounseled conviction is also uncertain.
45. See Howard v. Craven, 446 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1971) (reversing conviction);
Subilosky v. Moore, 443 F.2d 334 (1st Cir. 1971) (affirming); Gilday v. Scafati, 428Washington University Open Scholarship
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cases in which uncounseled convictions were admitted into evidence,
then lower courts will probably determine the limits of harmless error
by the same balancing technique employed in the pre-Loper decisions
which considered the issue. 46
As noted above the Loper court explicitly refused to decide whether
an uncounseled felony conviction could be used to impeach a specific
statement made by a defendant from the witness stand. Since Loper
two courts have considered this question in the context of a statement
made on direct examination. In United States ex rel. Walker v. Fol-
lette47 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the prosecution
could elicit testimony of previous uncounseled convictions from a defend-
ant who had on direct examination denied that he had been convicted of
a crime. The court argued that the rule established in Harris v. New
York 48 permitted the use of "illegal evidence" to rebut a defendant's
lies. Furthermore, the court expressly rejected any distinction between
illegal evidence under Miranda and Gideon. In the second case,
United States v. Nadaline,49 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
F.2d 1027 (1st Cir. 1970) (affirming); Spaulding v. State, 481 P.2d 389 (Alas. 1971)
(reversing); People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 204, 430 P.2d 15, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457
(1967) (reversing in part); Johnson v. State, 9 Md. App. 436, 265 A.2d 281 (1970)
(affirming); Subilosky v. Commonwealth, - Mass. -, 265 N.E.2d 80 (1970) (affirm-
ing); Gilday v. Commonwealth, 355 Mass. 799, 247 N.E.2d 396 (1969) (affirming);
Simmons v. State, 456 S.W.2d 66 (Texas 1970) (affirming).
For a post-Loper case in which a state court divided over the question of harmless
error, see Wood v. Texas, 478 SW.2d 513 (Texas 1972).
One state court felt the Loper opinion might be extended by Argersinger to include
uncounseled misdemeanor convictions, but only when those convictions resulted in the
imposition of a jail sentence. See Commonwealth v. Boudreau, - Mass. -, 285 N.E.2d
915 (1972).
46. Factors considered by courts were: the number of witnesses testifying against
the defendant; the amount of all direct evidence presented against the defendant;
whether the defendant introduced his criminal activity in his direct testimony; and
evidence other than the invalid convictions introduced for impeachment purposes.
See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
47. 443 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1971).
48. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The Court in Harris allowed the admission of statements
made by the defendant during an uncounseled interrogation to contradict the defendant
on the witness stand. Although the evidence was constitutionally invalid because of the
absence of counsel, the Court reasoned that the violation of the defendant's constitu-
tional rights in obtaining the evidence should not be a license to commit perjury. For
discussions of Harris, see Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Ob-
servations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J.
1198 (1971); Note, Impeachment by Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence: The Rule
of Harris v. New York, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 441.
49. 471 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1973).
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the conviction of a defendant whose statement on direct examination that
he was not a violent person was impeached on cross-examination by the
prosecutor eliciting testimony from the defendant about a prior convic-
tion for breaking and entering. The court justified its holding on two
grounds. First, the court read the Loper disclaimer as authorizing the
use of invalid convictions to contradict false testimony by a defendant.
Secondly, the court held the introduction of the evidence to be harmless
error.
The reasoning of the two courts seems inconsistent with Harris and
at odds with the Loper rationale. The impeachment exception author-
ized in Harris extended only to otherwise trustworthy evidence. Under
Gideon the conviction and thus its factual basis are rejected as untrust-
worthy and unreliable because of the absence of counsel. 50 Further-
more, the courts' reading of the Loper exception merely allows a prose-
cutor to introduce evidence of uncounseled convictions on a pretext."
For instance, breaking and entering is not a crime of violence.
Perhaps the Supreme Court in Loper refused to consider the question
because they wanted to observe the result in the lower federal courts of
permitting such an exception. The one instance in which evidence of
a defendant's past conviction could be used consistent with the rules in
Loper and Harris to rebut a defendant's direct testimony is if he testified
that he was in one place when actually he was in jail, but it is doubtful
that the court left the question open for such a narrow use.
THE RETROACTIVITY OF GIDEON IN LOPER
The Gideon decision has been applied retroactively to allow prisoners
incarcerated under an uncounseled conviction obtained prior to Gideon
to attack the validity of that conviction. Although no one on the present
Court objects to this retroactive application, four Justices dissented
strongly over the type of retroactivity allowed in Loper,52 in which
the Court allowed the defendant to use the Gideon rationale to attack
50. The Court in Gideon stated that an uncounseled defendant might well be con-
victed by incompetent, irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible evidence. This possibility,
among others, caused the court to hold that in all felony cases an indigent defendant
had a right to appointed counsel. 372 U.S. at 345.
51. See note 27 supra.
52. The Chief Justice, one of the dissenters, pointed out that the issue in Loper
involved a trial which occurred prior to Gideon. At Loper's trial in 1947, the presiding
judge could not have imagined that evidence of an uncounseled conviction was in any
way tainted, since no judge could have anticipated the Gideon decision of 1963.
209
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a counseled conviction obtained prior to Gideon in which uncounseled
convictions were used to undermine the defendant's credibility.53
The Supreme Court had four alternatives open to it in deciding the
retroactivity issue in Loper. 54  First, it could have decided that the Lo-
per decision would be applied only prospectively.", Secondly, the
Court could have applied Loper retroactively to all convictions similar to
Loper obtained subsequent to Burgett, since that was the first case to
apply Gideon to evidentiary matters. Thirdly, the Court could have
declared all Loper-type convictions obtained after Gideon to be subject
to attack, an alternative apparently accepted by the Burgett court.5
Finally, the Court could apply the Loper decision to all similar cases,
53. While there is a similar retroactivity question in regard to Tucker, the problem
is not as significant, since the resentencing required by Tucker has a much less burden-
some impact on the courts than providing a new trial as might be required by Loper.
54. As summarized by the Court in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967),
three factors are considered in determining whether retroactivity is to be given a deci-
sion: (1) the purpose served by the new standards; (2) the extent of reliance by
law enforcement authorities on the old standards; and (3) the effect on the administra-
tion of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. The Stovall decision
denied retroactivity to United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), which require the exclusion of identification evidence
tainted by exhibiting the accused to the identifying witness before trial in the absence of
counsel The Court found that giving retroactive effect to Wade and Gilbert would
disrupt the administration of criminal justice. Likewise, the consideration of the ef-
fect on the administration of criminal justice appears to be the key consideration in
determining whether to give a Loper-like application to Argersinger.
55. Not all decisions concerning the sixth amendment are applied retroactively.
In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), the Court held that any charge carrying
a possible sentence in excess of six months was subject to jury trial provisions of the
sixth amendment. In United States ex rel. Farmer v. Kosan, 440 F.2d 1256 (2d Cir.
1971), the court gave only prospective application to Baldwin. Considering the cri-
teria set out in Stovall regarding retroactivity, the court stated, 'The possibility of
collateral attacks by large numbers of persons convicted without a jury trial would pose
an administrative burden on the criminal court in New York City already dangerously
close to total collapse, as this court is well aware, such as to persuade us that justice
would not be served by holding Baldwin retroactive." 440 F.2d at 1259. See also
United States ex rel. Butler v. Thomas, 440 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1971). But see Arsen-
ault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 6 (1968): 'The right to counsel at trial . . . ; on
appeal . . . ; and at other 'critical' stages of the criminal proceedings . . . have all been
made retroactive, since the 'denial of the right must almost invariably deny a fair
trial."
56. Burgett involved review of a post-Gideon conviction. The viewpoint in that
case is easily justified, since after Gideon every judge could be expected to realize that
persons charged with a felony had a constitutional right to counsel. Use of the fruits
of an uncounseled proceeding, the conviction, should be impermissible in order to give
full effect to the constitutional protection established by Gideon and to avoid the de-
fendant suffering further for an earlier violation of his constitutional rights.
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regardless of the date when the conviction was obtained. It was this
last alternative which the Loper Court accepted.
As a practical matter, full retroactivity of Loper might not result in
a heavy administrative burden on the courts. Most prisoners con-
victed before Gideon who could have raised such a Gideon retroac-
tivity issue as Loper did in his case have already been released in the
period between the Gideon and Loper decisions. 57  On the other hand,
whether a retroactive application of Gideon in the Loper manner will
create an administrative burden for the courts depends primarily on
how much litigation is created on behalf of prisoners currently incar-
cerated under counseled convictions, with uncounseled convictions as
evidence, obtained after Gideon but prior to Loper. It is easier to
justify an application of Loper to post-Burgett cases than to pre-
Burgett convictions because Loper is considered by the Court to be a
clarification of the decision in Burgett.
It is uncertain whether the Supreme Court will apply Argersinger in
a manner similar to the way Loper has applied retroactivity to Gideon.
Not only must the Court decide that Argersinger should be applied to
render invalid prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions, but the
Court must also decide that the Loper rationale applies to counseled
convictions in which uncounseled misdemeanor convictions were used
to impeach the defendant's testimony. There are two factors which
militate against a retroactive application of Argersinger in a fashion
similar to that allowed Gideon in Loper. The Supreme Court may
decide that in fact misdemeanor convictions do not create a sufficient
impression upon the jurors or judge to justify the practical difficulties
which may arise from a retroactive application of Argersinger in a Loper-
type situation.5  Secondly, the number of prisoners who would be
57. Brief for respondent at 25, United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972):
Among federal prisoners only 12 to 14 percent have received sentences of
five years or more. Appellate Review of Sentences, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary on S. 2722, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 12 (March 1966).
The average prisoner serves only 61 percent of his sentence. Id. at 52. More
than 91 percent of federal prisoners are released from prison within five
years. Among state prisoners an even greater percentage are released within
five years (99 percent in some states, such as Wisconsin). Advisory Council
of Judges of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Model Sen-
tencing Act 24-25 (1963).
58. There is no empirical data on the adverse effect of misdemeanor convictions on
the minds of jurors or judges. It is debatable whether jurors actually distinguish be-
tween a prior conviction for a felony and a conviction for a misdemeanor. Cer-Washington University Open Scholarship
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in a position to attack a conviction might overwhelm the court system,"0
although this administrative burden could be minimized if judges were
to anticipate a future Supreme Court opinion applying Argersinger in
the Loper situation.0°
CONCLUSION
The decisions by the Supreme Court in Tucker and Loper, that prior
felony convictions invalid because of the denial of the defendant's con-
stitutional right to counsel may not be used in subsequent criminal pro-
ceedings to either enhance punishment or impeach the general credi-
bility of the defendant as a witness, are consistent extensions of the right
to counsel announced in Gideon and further developed by Burgett.
That Burgett, Tucker and Loper are all based on the rationale of pre.
serving the principle of Gideon that one should not suffer from denial
of his constitutional right to counsel makes ripe the question of whether
use of prior convictions resulting from proceedings in which the de-
fendant was denied his Argersinger right to counsel is reversible error.
The vast number of persons with misdemeanor convictions indicates that
a defendant placed in a Tucker- or Loper-type situation by use of con-
victions uncounseled under the Argersinger rule may soon appear before
the Supreme Court.
tainly if the prior conviction is for the same crime with which the defendant is
charged, the effect of the introduction of the prior conviction is highly prejudicial, re-
gardless of whether it is for a felony or a misdemeanor.
59. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 n.4 (1972):
In 1965, 314,000 defendants were charged with felonies in state courts, and
24,000 were charged with felonies in federal courts. President's Commission
of Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The
Courts 55 (1967). Exclusive of traffic offenses, however, it is estimated that
there are annually between four and five million court cases involving mis-
demeanors.
60. Judges might now be expected to connect the rationale of Loper with Arger-
singer to conclude that the use of convictions in which defendant was deprived of his
right to counsel as established by Argersinger is error. If so, then the practical problem
of the amount of litigation which a Loper-like application of Argersinger would create
will be diminished. Another factor which would affect the number of persons seeking
relief is the time lag between Argersinger and a decision applying Loper to uncounseled
misdemeanors. If the lag is small, then the number of post-Argersinger convictions
which might then be infirm would be smaller in comparison to the number of persons
who, though aided by counsel, were convicted prior to Argersinger on evidence which
includes, in part, the use of uncounseled misdemeanor convictions. As this time lag
increases, this proportion would change to the point, such as perhaps existed in Loper,
where there are so few prisoners still in jails under pre-Argersinger convictions that
they present no practical barrier to full retroactivity.
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